A manufacturer relies on governance mechanisms to reduce the risk involved in the relationship with its supplier; however, which governance mechanism (i.e., output or process control) the manufacturer develops in an asymmetrical power relationship with its supplier has yet to be determined. This study proposes an integrative model in which inter-organizational benevolence and credibility are conditions affecting a manufacturer's propensity for governance mechanisms. This study proposes that the manufacturer's perception of the supplier's benevolence weakens the justification for a high degree of process control over its supplier, while the supplier's credible behavior weakens the justification for a high degree of output control. This study suggests that the manufacturer should consider the level of benevolence and credibility it bestows on its supplier when selecting an appropriate control mechanism to deal with asymmetrical power structures. When a manufacturer does not trust its supplier's benevolence and credibility under conditions of power asymmetry, the manufacturer should consider adopting process and output controls.
xchange parties, as social entities, develop close relationships with their exchange partners, which fosters trust. Trust facilitates an exchange between channel members (Andaleeb 1992) and plays a vital role in interfirm relationships (Morgan and Hunt 1994 .; Thus, trust has emerged as a central component in the channels and in business-to-business literature (Wilson 1995) .
Several researchers imply that trust could influence levels of interfirm control (Moorman et al 1992; Ouchi 1979) . Ouchi (1979) argues that exchange parties must trust their exchange partners, or must closely monitor these partners. Although trust is not directly mentioned, John (1984) points out that it is insufficient to rely on interfirm control alone, such that internalized social restraints must be cultivated to increase control.
The question that must be answered is what kind of control or what level of control should be maintained over the exchange partner when there is trust between parties. Despite our advanced knowledge regarding control mechanisms (Jap and Ganesan 2000; Bello et al 1997; Heide 1994) , previous research has exposed several gaps that have yet to be addressed. First, existing literature conducted in the area of business-to-business marketing is limited in its explanation of the influence of social context on a firm's inter-organizational control level. Thus, existing literature does not explain why two firms with perceptions of the same level of power asymmetry will exercise different levels of control over their exchange partners (Chiles and McMackin 1996) . Moorman et al. (1992) propose that trust reduces perceived uncertainty, such that reduced uncertainty could lead to a decrease in control over the trusted exchange partner. Thus, the effect of trust on interfirm control requires further investigation.
Second, although there are a few theoretical discussions that address the dimensions of trust, credibility and benevolence (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994) , the effect of these dimensions on interfirm control has not been fully elucidated. Benevolence refers to an exchange partner's motivation to benefit the party in question, while credibility refers to the effectiveness and reliability of the exchange partner's performance (Ganesan 1994) . Since the trust sources of the two trust dimensions differ (e.g., benevolence is motivation, while credibility is performance), their effect on diverse interfirm controls might vary. For instance, interfirm output control monitors measurable performance (i.e., checking the punctuality of delivery), suggesting that the credibility of a partner's performance might be a relevant factor affecting the interfirm control of performance.
To address these research gaps, this study proposes the conditions under which a manufacturer in an asymmetrical power structure chooses appropriate control over its supplier. We propose that the inclusion of benevolence and credibility, two dimensions of trust, may explain different levels of process and output control in the relationship between a manufacturer and its supplier.
We hope to contribute to the existing knowledge on interfirm control in two ways. First, we divide trust into two dimensions, benevolence and credibility, and propose that these dimensions have a moderating effect on the level of interfirm control in diverse interfirm power. Benevolence is a cognitive evaluation that is difficult to measure objectively, whereas credibility is an objective behavioral variable that is affected by output performance. Benevolence therefore might be relevant to process control used in immeasurable performance, and credibility could be affect output control. Second, we divide control into two categories, process and output control, and propose the moderating effects of credibility and benevolence on these control mechanisms. We propose that, under a diverse interfirm power relationship, the level of interfirm benevolence will influence the level of interfirm process control, whereas interfirm credibility will impact the manufacturer's output control. The theoretical framework of this study is presented in Figure 1 .
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Trust: benevolence and credibility Trust is defined as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner whose behavior is outside of the other partner's control (Mayer, Davis, and Shoorman 1995; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992; Zand 1972) . The voluntary dependence of a manufacturer on its supplier is based on optimistic expectations regarding outcomes (Hosmer 1995) .
Thus, it is possible that the manufacturer will be worse off if its trust in its supplier is not fulfilled than if it does not trust its supplier in the first place. Trust is therefore a manufacturer's belief that the supplier will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the manufacturer, as well as not take actions that would result in negative outcomes (Anderson and Narus 1990) . Trust requires a subjective projection of perceived competence onto an uncertain future (Madhavan and Grover 1998 ). An exchange party's belief in its partner's trustworthiness is derived from the assessment (calculation) of the partner's credibility and benevolence (Doney and Cannon 1997) . Thus, the higher the manufacturer's trust in its supplier, the higher the prediction of the supplier's credible behavior and benevolent intention, and the lower the probability that the supplier will betray the manufacturer (Moorman et al 1992) . The trust proposed here thus reflects two distinct dimensions: benevolence and credibility.
Benevolence refers to the intention and motivation of the supplier to benefit the manufacturer (Ganesan 1994) . Benevolence focuses on the motives and intentions of the exchange partner, so it includes characteristics attributed to the partner rather than specific behavior (Doney and Cannon 1997) .
Credibility is the effectiveness and reliability with which the supplier performs the job (Ganesan 1994 ). When a supplier shows consistent and stable patterns of reliable behavior, the firm will be credited with credible performance. A manufacturer's trust in its supplier's credibility therefore can be measured objectively through monitoring the supplier's performance, whereas the supplier's benevolent intentions or motivations cannot be measured objec- 
Controls: Output and Process
Previous research has addressed control mechanisms that exist between organizations (Bello and Gilliland 1997; Ouchi and Maguire 1975) and within organizations (Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishanan 1993) . Two types of control mechanisms have been identified: process control and output control. Process control restricts the exchange partner's behavior by forcing them to conduct relevant tasks and activities to achieve desirable ends (Bello and Gilliland 1997; Stump and Heide 1996; Celly and Fraizier 1996) , while output control directly influences the ends achieved by the supplier rather than specifying the supplier's behavior (Bello and Gilliland 1997) . Process control involves manufacturer intervention in its supplier's production decisions, such as the supplier's inventory level, production process, or selection of its subsuppliers. Through process control, the manufacturer believes it can increase the output of the supplier. Output control includes monitoring the supplier's outputs, such as punctual delivery or defective parts.
Process control is relevant when the supplier's performance outputs are too difficult to measure, while output control is appropriate when performance outputs can be measured effectively (Bello and Gilliland 1997) . The manufacturer that can reliably measure output can therefore evaluate the credibility of its partner through a measure of performance (e.g., punctual delivery or the number of defective parts). Thus, when a manufacturer has difficulty measuring the performance of its supplier, the manufacturer cannot evaluate the credibility of the supplier. Thus, credibility is not developed in situations of manufacturer process control over suppliers.
Monitoring the output of the supplier (e.g., evaluating the punctuality of delivery or the quality of supplied parts) does not generate negative feelings, since monitoring output does not intervene in the supplier's decision making. Thus, a manufacturer cannot measure benevolence, since monitoring does not require the supplier to have benevolent intentions for cooperating with a manufacturer's intervention.
Manufacturer power
Manufacturer power is the supplier's dependence on the manufacturer (Gap and Ganesan 2000) . Manufacturer power means that one party needs the other less and hence is more powerful. Interdependence presents the manufacturer with the problem of control over its supplier when the goals of the manufacturer differ from those of the supplier (Aiken and Hage 1968) . Goal-related discrepancies are common, and, thus, manufacturers will often see the need to develop control mechanisms to resolve these differences.
The more powerful the manufacturer is in an asymmetrical relationship, the more easily it can obtain the other partner's compliance by exercising its power (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) . The manufacturer with the asymmetrical power advantage over the supplier therefore could use its relative power (Lawler and Bacharach 1987) .
If a manufacturer does not trust in its supplier's benevolence, the manufacturer will be less likely to reveal relevant information to the supplier or will be more likely to distort information (Dirks and Ferrin 2001) . The supplier may respond in kind to the lack of information by failing to provide relevant information to the manufacturer. The manufacturer therefore may be suspicious of the information provided by its supplier. Therefore, a manufacturer with a power advantage over its supplier is likely to wield its power to force its supplier to meet its requirements for inventory levels or the quality of supplied parts. Thus, H1a: When a manufacturer's perception of supplier benevolence is low, there is a positive relationship between manufacturer power and the manufacturer's propensity for process control over the supplier.
The presence of trust in an inter-organizational relationship leads to more accurate and timely information exchange (Lewis and Weight 1985; Zand 1972) . Such information exchange affords exchange parties a better understanding of their partners, business environments and markets. Thus, a manufacturer with a benevolent supplier is equipped with information about the supplier and the component markets, which reduces the potential for of opportunistic supplier behavior.
Exchange parties with benevolent intentions enable the parties to find productive solutions to disagreements that might occur (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992) and to adopt a cooperative problem-solving approach (Schurr and Ozanne 1985) . This suggests that the hazard of opportunistic behavior can be mitigated if interfirm benevolence exists. The manufacturer with trust in its supplier's benevolence is thus less likely to enforce process control, since benevolence is barely associated with performance. Monitoring supplier output does not create negative feelings, since the supplier cannot detect the difference. Thus, H1b: When a manufacturer's perception of supplier benevolence is high, there is no relationship between manufacturer power and the manufacturer's propensity for process control over the supplier.
If a manufacturer does not believe in its supplier's credibility, it should monitor the supplier's performance through elements such as punctual delivery or the quality of the delivered products. Otherwise, the manufacturer might suffer from the supplier's poor performance. Thus, a powerful manufacturer with low confidence in its supplier's credibility is likely to use its power to control the output performance of the supplier, which forces the supplier to meet output requirements. The next hypothesis is therefore: H2a: When a manufacturer's perception of supplier credibility is low, there is a positive relationship between manufacturer power and the manufacturer's propensity for output control over the supplier.
Monitoring the output performance of the supplier incurs transaction costs such as the expenditures of checking the price of parts in the market and monitoring the quality of the supplied parts (Noordewier et al 1990) . Thus, when the manufacturer thinks it can obtain its goal without monitoring the supplier, it does not need to waste its resources on such endeavors. A manufacturer's trust in its supplier's credibility will therefore reduce transaction costs (Chiles and McMackin 1996) . Thus, although a manufacturer may possess asymmetrical power over its supplier, a high level of supplier credibility allows the manufacturer to maintain a low level of output control over the supplier. Therefore: H2b: When a manufacturer's perception of supplier credibility is high, there is no relationship between power asymmetry and the manufacturer's propensity for output control over the supplier.
Methodology

Research Setting and Data Collection
The context chosen for this study was the relationship between a manufacturer and its major supplier. The major supplier was considered the one from which the informant's company made the largest amount of purchases during the previous year. This major supplier served as the referent for all questions in our mail survey. The above setting was selected because the major supplier is the one with whom the manufacturer is likely to have the most intense interactions and the opportunity to exercise vertical control.
Sample and Respondents
The manufacturers in this study were selected randomly from a Dun and Bradstreet mailing list. We used the SIC codes 3679 (electronic), 2399 (textile), 3469 (metal), and 3499 (steel), representing manufacturing companies. Fortynine percent of the manufacturers were chosen from the electric and electronic industries, where companies experience particularly volatile environments, such as unpredictable supply and parts prices. The rest of the companies were within industries such as textile and steel products, which have relatively constant environments. In this way, we expected to create sizable variance in terms of the environments sampled in our study. As this research addresses buyer governance structure, we chose the heads of purchasing departments of the manufacturing companies as the key informants. Purchasing managers are responsible for securing materials from suppliers, and hence can be expected to be knowledgeable about the materials bought and to have a close relationship with suppliers (Hutt and Speh 1992) .
To assess whether the key informants in our study had relevant knowledge, a pre-test was conducted. Pre-test respondents were asked whether they felt competent enough to respond to the survey questions (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992). Informants were evaluated by their responses to the survey questions. They were asked how long they had been doing business with the supplier and had been in their current positions. The informants were also asked how well they knew their suppliers in terms of the latter's level of dependence on the informant's company -i.e. how much they knew about the supplier's product. The pre-test results indicated that the respondent companies had, on average, a 20-year relationship with their major suppliers. The average length of time for which each informant had occupied his or her current position was 6.5 years. These mean scores suggest that the purchasing managers surveyed had sufficient opportunity to interact with their main suppliers and that they were qualified informants.
Procedure
Each purchasing manager in our sample was mailed 1) a questionnaire, 2) a cover letter requesting that they complete the enclosed questionnaire, and 3) a postage-paid return envelope. Two weeks after the first mailing, a second mailing was conducted.
A total of 680 questionnaires were mailed, and 21 questionnaires were undelivered. Of the remainder, 176 were completed and returned for a response rate of 26.70%. All returned questionnaires were reviewed for completeness. Two questionnaires with numerous missing answers were dropped from the sample. The remaining 174 questionnaires were used in our analysis.
Nonresponse Bias
The respondents were divided into two equal groups based on the date of response (i.e., early respondents, late respondents). We tested for nonresponse bias by comparing early respondents with late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977) . The mean values for both the scale and characteristics of the company and key information (i.e., duration of the relationship with the supplier, years of experience as a purchasing manager in the company, trust, environmental volatility) were compared across the two groups. The results of this comparison indicated no significant differences between the two groups with regard to those scales and characteristics, suggesting that the data were not skewed by non-response bias (the p-values for these comparisons ranged from .25 to .65).
Corporate Affiliations Plus (2000) was used for gathering secondary data on company characteristics for both responding and non-responding firms. Comparisons across the numbers of employees and total sales also produced no significant differences (p< .72 for employees and p< .50 for sales volume). Response rates across industry groups (electronics, metal, textile, and steel) did not differ either.
Measure Development
Measure development was carried out in two stages. In the first stage, existing measures for our constructs were gathered from the literature. In the second stage, depth interviews were conducted with three purchasing managers to verify the relevance of the items developed in the first stage. The wording of some of the items was revised based on input from the interviewed purchasing managers. All items used a 7-point Likert scale where 1 meant "strongly disagree" and 7 meant "strongly agree."
Two dimensions of trust, benevolence and credibility, were assessed through four and three items respectively. The scale for credibility addressed a partner's commitment to its promises, the partner's ability to keep promises, and the reliability of the partner's sincerity. The items for benevolence were adopted from Doney and Cannon (1997) .
In order to compute the variables of manufacturer's power, the supplier's dependence on the manufacturer was measured (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) . supplier's dependence on the manufacturer was assessed using four items: how easily the manufacturer could replace the current supplier's contributions to manufacturer's business, switching costs of replacing the current supplier, the difficulty of changing the current supplier with another; and overall dependence on the supplier (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Lusch and Brown 1996) .
Construct validity
Each variable that was measured with multiple items was subjected to a scale development and purification procedure. On the basis of item-total correlations, ill-fitting items were dropped. The subsequently reduced sets of items were subjected to confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS, and then reliability analyses were run for each construct to verify that all of the measures demonstrated satisfactory coefficient reliability.
First, convergent validity was tested. Based on these results, a item that had low loadings with intended factors were removed from the scales. Among the items for process control, level of inventory (Process 3) was deleted due to higher cross loading to the latent variable of supplier performance. After deleting these items, an acceptable fit of = 125.1 df= 80 (p=.018), GFI =.90 CFI = .93, IFI = .93 RMSEA = . 055). All of the factor loadings were highly significant (p <.01), which demonstrated the unidimensionality of the measures (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) . Further, reliability tests were done for each construct to see if the measures demonstrate satisfactory coefficient reliability. The reliabilities of the constructs were all above .70 (between 0.76 and 0.95), thus, these measures demonstrated adequate convergent validity and reliability.
Discriminant validity of all 5 latent constructs was onstructs were tested in pairs (10 tests altogether) if the restricted model (in which the correlation was fixed as one) was significantly worse than the freely estimated model (in which were highly significant, which shows the evidence of discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) . The
TABLE 1 Construct Measurement Summary:
Reliability SFL Benevolence When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare. This supplier is genuinely interested in the success of our business When making decisions, major supplier considers our firm's business growth Credibility The supplier keeps promises it makes to our firm. This supplier fulfills its commitments exactly as specified. This supplier fulfills its duty as we expected.
Process Control
This supplier's production processes are determined by your firm's requirement. This supplier's engineering changes are determined by your firm's requirements. This supplier's level of inventory is to a large extent decided by your firm. This Supplier's quality control procedures are to a large extent decided by your firm Output Control Your firm monitors the supplier's in-time delivery regularly. Your firm monitors the quality of supplied parts regularly. The price of supplied parts is determined by your firm. Supplier's Dependence on Its manufacturer It would be difficult for this supplier to replace the profits realized from your firm with another. This supplier's total costs of switching to another comparable customer would be prohibitive. This supplier is strongly dependent on your company. results of CFA such as goodness-of-fit index, factor loading, and reliability are reported in TABLE 1. Control Variables: We included industry and firm size as controls. Industry was coded as a dummy variable: electronic and electric industries = 1, other industries = 0. Firm size was indicated by the logarithm of the number of employees.
Measure Development
Measure development was carried out in two stages. In the first stage, existing measures for our constructs were gathered from the literature. In the second stage, depth interviews were conducted with three purchasing managers to verify the relevance of the items developed in the first stage. The wording of some of the items was revised based on input from the interviewed purchasing managers. All items used a 7-point Likert scale where 1 meant "strongly disagree" and 7 meant "strongly agree." Two dimensions of trust, benevolence and credibility, were assessed through four and three items respectively. The scale for credibility addressed a partner's commitment to its promises, the partner's ability to keep promises, and the reliability of the partner's sincerity. The items for benevolence were adopted from Doney and Cannon (1997) .
Analysis and Results
Tests of Hypotheses
The hypotheses were tested formally with multiple regressions. The variable in the regression model for hypotheses 1 The results in TABLE 3 show that the effect of manufacturer power on process control in the low benevolence group is significant and positive (t = 2.756, p < .05) as in H1. Contrastingly, in the high trust group, the relationship between manufacturer power and process control is not significant (t = 1.08, p > .05). These results support H1 and H2.
The effect of manufacturer power on output control in low credibility is significant and negative (t = 2.983, p < .05), as in H3. Finally, the relationship between manufacturer power and vertical control is not significant (t = 1.026, p > .05) as in H4. Thus, H3 and H4 are supported (see TABLE 3 ).
Discussion
Theoretical Implications
Since exchange parties interact with their exchange partners as social entities, they are likely to develop a social relationship represented by standard conduct, trust, or interdependence (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987) . These social factors are crucial for influencing inter-organizational relationships (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994; Noordewier et al 1990) . This study indicates that benevolence and credibility provide a solution for exchange parties that need to manage the power relationships shared with their partners. Trust in the credibility of exchange partners may alleviate the need to rely on output control under an asymmetrical interfirm power structure. Supplier benevolence gives its buyer (manufacturer) confidence that the supplier won't behave opportunistically for short-term benefit; thus, the manufacturer can manage the relationship without resorting to process control.
This study fits a later view of TCA in which opportunism varies depending on the exchange party (Williamson 1991 (Williamson , 1985 and on the situation (Wathne and Heide 2000); thus, benevolence and credibility can be developed and relied upon under the premise of opportunism. Williamson (1975) admits that exchange parties often act on the basis of trust, but he also argues that the difficulty in identifying trustworthy partners is so great that parties have to structure themselves as if all exchange partners cannot be trusted. He contends that, although not all parties are opportunistic, it is costly to sort out those who are from those who are not (Williamson 1985) . Therefore, Williamson, a strong believer in opportunism and interfirm integration, admits the coexistence of trust and opportunism. Nooteboom (1996) goes further to point out that it is unreasonable to ignore the formation of perceptions regarding propensities for opportunism and the possibility of building trust. This study demonstrates that the two dimensions of trust strongly influence inter-organizational control, so trust as well as the premise of opportunism should be considered key factors for interfirm controls. This study implies that the introduction of benevolence and credibility in the interfirm control model can shift the comparative cost of each control, which eventually affects the selection of hierarchical (high process and output controls) versus market (or low controls) governance structures. Market governance, which relies on benevolence and credibility, incurs relatively lower transaction costs than hierarchical governance due to a lower level of process and output control. Thus, exchange parties that typically choose hierarchical governance might select market governance when their perception of supplier benevolence and credibility is taken into consideration. Therefore, the inclusion of benevolence and credibility in the interfirm control model will enhance the predictive power of the interfirm governance structure.
Managerial Implications
These results suggest that credibility is important for manufacturers to reduce the level of needed control over suppliers. When manufacturers face various levels of asymmetrical interfirm power structures, interfirm control is not always the best tool to depend on. Since output control such as monitoring product quality or punctual delivery is costly, manufacturers should seek ways to reduce output control. The key aspect of this is how to protect themselves from partners that try to take advantage of the absence of control. A supplier's credibility can be a good solution to that problem. Since a manufacturer can calculate how credible its supplier is, it can reduce control over the supplier according to the amount of credibility. Thus, the manufacturer can reduce transaction costs and efficiently perform the buying function. Credibility is therefore a valuable economic asset exchange parties can rely on. Manufacturers should consider the credibility of their suppliers when deciding the level of control needed over the suppliers.
Manufacturers should find ways to foster benevolence in their relationships with suppliers. An exchange relationship characterized by a high level of process control cannot flexibly respond to changing environments (Andaleeb 1995) . Since a manufacturer unilaterally influences its supplier's inventory level, production processes, and quality control procedures, there is not a great deal of room for the supplier to make its own decisions. Thus, when a manufacturer seeks to change the order of components, its supplier will be very reluctant to respond to this request due to a lack of autonomy. In contrast, a supplier under low buyer process control will flexibly respond to change-of-order requests because inventory control is mainly the supplier's responsibility.
In practice, credibility and benevolence in interfirm social relationships can be assessed, since these are theoretical constructs it might be helpful to help managers operationalize them.
Limitations & Future Study
Although this study focuses on developing a model of interfirm control mechanisms in asymmetrical power structures, it does not empirically test this model. Since the propositions are based on the assumption that exchange parties adopt the most efficient level of interfirm control, it might be better to measure how each level of control contributes to the buyer's purchasing performance. Thus, further research is needed on the effect of the congruence between trust dimensions and their antecedents on buying performance.
Future research should be directed toward the investigation of the influence of benevolence on firm process control over its exchange partners in terms of transaction specific assets (TSIs). A TSI is a specific investment that is specialized for a particular exchange relationship, such that it cannot be used for other relationships (Williamson 1985) . A TSI therefore creates a hostage situation in which a partner can exploit the TSI holder opportunistically. Thus, according to TCA, a TSI is another key factor that forces the investing firm to control its partner, in order to safeguard the TSI. Thus, it could be interesting to study whether benevolence could function as a mechanism for reducing process control.
